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MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
PRESUMPTIONS UPON SALES OF LAND IN
PROBATE COURT
BY OSCAR C. RONKEN*
T HE probate courts of this state are courts of record and of
superior jurisdiction. Their records import absolute verity.
Their proceedings possess the same presumptions of jurisdiction
and regularity possessed by superior courts of common law juris-
diction, and their records and judgments cannot be impeached in
collateral proceedings.'
To this general rule, however, there are certain exceptions.
These follow from section 7369, General Statutes 1913, which
is as follows:
"In case of an action relating to any estate sold by a- repre-
sentative in which an heir or person claiming under the decedent,
or a ward or person claiming under him, shall contest the validity
of the same, it shall not be avoided on account of any irregularity
in the proceedings if it appears:
1. That the representative was licensed to make the sa!e by
the probate court having jurisdiction.
2. That he gave a bond which was approved by the court.
3. That he took the oath prescribed in this chapter.
4. That he gave notice of the time and place of sale as in
this chapter prescribed, if such notice was required by the order
of license.
5. That the premises were sold in the manner required by
the order of license, and the sale confirmed by the court, and
that they are held by one who purchased them in good faith."
The effect of this statute is to abolish the usual presumptions
in so far as these five points are concerned. As to these, the
proceeding cannot be aided by any presumption, but must stand
or fall solely by the matter contained in the record. Upon these
points, the proceeding may be questioned collaterally, and the
proceeding must fail unless the record itself affirmatively shows
a full and complete compliance with the law.
2
Some curious results follow from this statute. The bond is
for the benefit of those who are entitled to the proceeds of the
sale, and not for the benefit of the purchaser. Aside from this
*Of the Rochester, Minnesota, Bar.
'Minn., constitution, art. 6, p. 7; Dayton v. Mintzer, (1876) 22 Minn.
393; Kurtz v. St. Paul & Duluth Ry. Co., (1895) 61 Minn. 18, 63 N.W. 1.2 Babcock v. Cobb, (1866) 11 Minn. 347; Cater v. Steeves, (1905)
95 Minn. 225, 103 N.W. 885.
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statute, it would seem, therefore, that where a sale has been made
and the proceeds properly accounted for, it would be immaterial
that a bond had not been made and filed. But under this statute,
though the proceeds have been properly accounted for, the sale,
when attacked, must be set aside if the record fails to show af-
firmatively that a bond was in fact made and filed. 3 The taking of
the oath is for the purpose of greater certainty that the execu-
tor and administrator will faithfully execute his trust. But
under this statute, though the representative has executed his
trust with the most scrupulous fidelity, and though the sale has
been confirmed by the court, yet it must be set aside, when ques-
tioned, if the record fails to show affirmatively that the oath
was taken.4
If on the other hand an objection is made to the sale because
of failure to give notice of the appointment of a guardian who
has undertaken to sell land,* or because of the failure to give the
prescribed notice for a hearing on the petition for license to sell
land,' or to the allowance of claims not properly allowable against
the estate,7 or to the failure to post notices in three of the most
public places in the city,' the objection cannot be heard unless
on an appeal or in an action brought directly for the purpose of
setting the sale aside. Notice is generally considered as of funda-
mental importance in any legal proceeding; but under this statute
it seems that the fundamentals may be supplied by presumption,
while the absence from the record of trivial details renders the
entire proceeding utterly void.
Clearly, these results could not have been intended. Why,
then, was this statute passed? A brief review of the history of
this piece of legislation will shed some light on this question. As
this statute found its way into our laws from the state of Massa-
chusetts, a reference to its history in that state will also be neces-
sary.
By the charter granted to Massachusetts Bay colony by Wil-
liam and Mary in 1691 it was provided:
"And we do of our further Grace, certain knowledge and mere
motion, grant, establish, and ordain, for us, our heirs and suc-
cessors, that the Great and General Court or Assembly of our
said province or territory for the time being, convened as afore-
3Babcock v. Cobb, (1866) 11 Minn. 347.4Hugo v. Miller, (1892) 50 Minn. 105, 52 N.W. 381.5Davis v. Hudson, (1881) 29 Minn. 27, 11 N.W. 136.6Dayton v. Mintzer, (1876) 22 Minn. 393.
7O'Brien v. Larson, (1898) 71 Minn. 371, 74 N.W. 148.
8Hugo v. Miller, (1892) 50 Minn. 105, 52 N.W. 381.
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said, shall forever have full power and authority to erect and
constitute judicatories and courts of record, or other courts, to
be held in the name of us, our heirs and successors, for the hear-
ing, trying and determining of all manner of crimes, offences,
pleas, proceedings, plaints, actions, matters, causes and things
whatsoever, arising or happening within our said province or
territory, or between persons inhabiting or-residing there, whether
the same be criminal or civil, and whether the said crimes be
capital or not capital, and whether the said pleas be real, personal
or mixed....
"And we do for us, our heirs and successors grant, establish
and ordain that the governor of our said province or territory for
the time being, with the counsel or Associates, may do, execute
or perform all that is necessary for the probate of wills, and
granting of administration for, locating or concerning any in-
terest or estate which any person or persons shall have within
our said province or territory."
By this provision, then, the probating of wills, or the granting
of administration, was not intrusted to any court to be estab-
lished; it was simply made a part of the duties of the governor of
,the colony and his associates. An attempt was made to pass a
law providing for county courts of probate, but it was vetoed
by the crown. In this way matters stood until after the beginning
of the Revolution. Under this organization, what was called
courts of probate was established and judges of probate ap-
pointed. But although the term court was used, it is apparent
that the judges of probate were in fact only surrogates of the
governor and his associates. 9 There was up to this time no
statute prescribing or regulating their powers.
In 1780 a constitution was adopted providing for judges of
probate who "shall hold their courts at such place or places, on
fixed days, as the convenience of the people shall require." There
was provision for an appeal to the governor and his associates.
Then came the enactment of chapter 47, Laws of 1784. This law
provided for the establishment of courts of probate, the appoint-
ment of judges and registers of probate, and prescribed their
jurisdiction, and vested them with full authority to carry it into
effect. By its provisions, appeal no longer lay to the governor
and his associates, but to the supreme court of probate of the
commonwealth. The act provided that the supreme judicial court
should also be the supreme court of probate. By virtue of this
act, the organization of the probate courts was complete, and
from this time on the probating of wills and the granting of
0See note 10.
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administrat'on were proceedings conducted exclusively by them,
and were no longer prerogatives of the office of the governor
and his associates.
It is easy to see from this beginning of the courts of probate
in the state of Massachusetts that they could not be regarded in
any other light than that of courts of inferior and limited juris-
diction, and as such they were in fact regarded from their be-
ginning until the enactment of chapter 415, Laws of 1891; Re-
vised Laws, chapter 162, paragraph 2. Their records did not
import absolute verity. There was no presumption in favor of
their jurisdiction, or the regularity of their proceedings and
decrees in case the record was silent in essential particulars. It
was the accepted doctrine that all the requirements of the statute
relating to the sale of real estate in probate court must be
substantially complied with, or the proceedings were open to
collateral attack."0
This was still the rule when chapter 71, paragraph 38, Re-
vised Statutes 1836, was enacted. It was in form and substance
like the one found in our own statutes, and quoted above. It
was plainly a remedial statute, designed for the purpose of limit-
ing to some extent the scope of the collateral inquiry in such
cases. When applied to such a situation it gave to titles so
acquired a certain degree of repose and certainty which they
otherwise would not have had.
This statute in substantially its original form found its way
from Massachusetts into the laws of the state of Michigan, and
from there into the laws of the state of Wisconsin, where it was
in force at the time the state was admitted into the Union. Minne-
sota was organized as a territory in 1848. The organic act
provided:
"The laws in force in the territory of Wisconsin at the date
of the admission of the state of Wisconsin shall continue to
be valid and operative therein so far as the same be not incom-
patible with the provisions of this act, subject, nevertheless, to
be altered, modified, or repealed by the governor and legislative
assembly of the said territory of Minnesota."1 1
Thus the statute became a law of the territory of Minnesota
when it was first organized. It was re-enacted by one of the
first legislatures of the territory and became Chapter 61 of the
Laws of 1851.
1°Peters v. Peters, (1851) 8 Cush. (Mass.) 529; Wales v. Willard,(1806) 2 Mass. 119; Chase v. Hathaway, (1817) 14 Mass. 222.
"Organic act, par. 12.
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The organic act, which made the laws of the territory of
Wisconsin applicable to the territory of Minnesota, also provided
for probate courts for the territory. It provided:
"The judicial power of said territory shall be vested in a
supreme court, district courts, probate courts, and in justices of
the peace. . . . The jurisdiction of the several courts here-
in provided for, both appellate and original, and that of the
probate courts, and of the justices of the peace, shall be as limited
by law."1 2
Under this provision the probate courts of the territory were
not courts of superior jurisdiction. The presumption of verity
and regularity of their records and proceedings did not obtain.
The propriety and utility of the statute in question during this
period of time is therefore apparent. But when the constitution
was adopted it provided:
"There shall be established in each organized county in the
state a probate court, which shall be a court of record.
A probate court shall have jurisdiction over the estates of de-
ceased persons, and persons under guardianship."'"
It is now well established that the probate courts thus created
by the constitution are courts of superior jurisdiction, whose
records and proceedings are protected by the presumptions of
verity and regularity. Yet, probably influenced by the fact that
they were not so considered at their inception, it seems to have
remained doubtful for some time whether they were or were
not of superior jurisdiction. It was not until the decision in the
case of Davis v. Hudson,4 that the doctrine of superior juris-
diction was firmly established. 5
Notwithstanding the change that has thus occurred in the
constitution of the probate courts of this state since the enact-
ment of this statute, it has been permitted to remain unchanged
on the statute books to this day. In its inception it was meant
to give repose and certainty to titles derived through sales in
probate court, and as long as the probate courts of this state were
considered inferior and without protecting presumptions, it had
that effect. But since these courts became courts of superior
jurisdiction, whose records and proceedings are protected by
presumptions of verity and regularity, the effect of this statute is
just the reverse. Instead of closing the door to collateral attack,
it opens it. Instead of limiting the inquiry, it makes new oppor-
"2Organic act, par. 9.
"3Minn. Constitution, art. 6, par. 7.
14(1881) 29 Minn. 27, 11 N.W. 136.
"5Buntin v. Root, (1896) 66 Minn. 454, 69 N.W. 330.
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tunities for inquiry. Instead of giving real estate titles derived
through probate sales repose and certainty, it gives them uncer-
tainty.
An impressive number of titles are derived through sales in
probate court. They should be made as certain as it is possible
to make them consistent with the rights of those who may have
an interest to protect. All the presumptions of jurisdiction and
regularity attaching to other proceedings of a probate court should
also attach to real estate sales. The same presumption that would
attach to a sale in district court should also attach to one in
probate court. But for this statute such would be the case. The
statute has failed of its original purpose and should be repealed.
Thereupon the presumptions of verity and regularity attaching
to proceedings in courts of superior jurisdiction would attach
to sales of real estate in probate court, and would give them the
same degree of security that is given to sales of real estate in
district court.
